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This work project uses a political economy approach to explain the determinants and the 
differences in the allocation of the European Union Regional Transfers during the 2007-
2013 and 2014-2020 European Multiannual Financial Frameworks. This work project 
uses two regression analysis to conclude that the economic condition of a member state 
is the biggest determinant of EU regional transfers, however with the economic growth 
of the “poorest” EU member states and the tightening of the economic and development 
gap between Western and Eastern Europe, other factors, mainly attitudes towards the EU 
and a member state track record managing EU transfers, play a bigger role in their 
allocation. 
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I.  Introduction  
On the 5th of  November 2019 a group of 16 EU heads of government met in Prague, this 
group was known as the “Friends of Cohesion” and consisted in the heads of government 
of the countries that have benefited more from EU Regional Transfers in the past 15 years 
(See appendix 1 and 2), Estonia, Croatia, Malta, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Romania, Italy, Portugal, Greece and the Visegrad 4 countries (Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic). The goal of this encounter was clear, to show 
opposition to the proposed cuts in regional Transfers in the next EU Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) or EU multiannual budget for 2021-2027, mainly in the 
Cohesion Policy funds and in the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The 
EU multiannual budget is always a difficult subject to find an agreement on, there are 
always discussions on who should contribute more, the amount that each country pays 
and how much of the transfers are allocated to each member state, but this time the 
discussions were even more difficult than usual due to the departure of the United 
Kingdom from the European Union, the block was losing its second-biggest net payer, 
all of this before the COVID-19 pandemic. 
“Making Europe’s regions and cities more competitive, fostering growth and creating 
jobs”  This is the official saying of the European Regional Policy, it  targets regions and 
cities in the European Union in order to support the creation of jobs, business 
competitiveness, economic and sustainable development, by financing up to 80% of 
public investment in key projects to reduce the economic development gap between 
European regions and to foster economic cohesion (Anderson, 1995).  
The EU regional policy can be of the upmost importance in several countries, for transport 
infrastructures, both roads and rails as well as social (education, health, social services) 
and economic (IT, energy) infrastructures (Cerniglia et Saraceno, 2020). Cohesion Funds 
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(CF) and ERDF expenditures fund around one sixth of the overall European public 
investment, in more recent years they have supported approximately 40% of total public 
investment in most CEE1  countries, but their role is also significant in some other 
countries, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal; between 2015 and 2017 more than 75% 
of the public investment made by the Portuguese Government was financed by regional 
transfers (Pinheiro, 2017), but the expenditures with regional transfers also produce 
significant economic spillovers in favor of more developed regions and countries in the 
EU (Cerniglia et Saraceno, 2020). 
The EU regional transfers, are part of the EU´s seven-year framework regulating its 
annual budget (Multiannual Financial Framework) and like stated before, are delivered 
through two main funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
Cohesion Fund (CF). According to the EU Commission the ERDF main goal is to 
strengthen economic and social cohesion in the European Union by correcting 
imbalances between its regions, and the CF aims to reduce economic and social 
disparities and to promote sustainable development . 
For this paper only the two above mentioned funds will be considered as regional 
Transfers or Cohesion Policy, they together with the European Social Fund (ESF), 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD), where the common agricultural policy (CAP) is included,  
make up the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds.  
The EU regional policy budget and rules are decided by both the Council and the 
European Parliament beginning with a proposal by the Commission, each Member State 
draws a National Strategic Reference Framework for the period of seven years, containing 
the strategy for how the transfers will be used including  lists of individual projects, then 
 
1 CEE – Central and Eastern Europe 
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the EU Commission uses what it calls, the official criteria also known as transparent 
procedures to allocate the transfers among the member states. The supervision takes place 
through national or regional authorities depending on the degree of self-governance and 
local autonomy (Ciffolilli, 2009). Amongst academics, it is not consensual whether the 
regional transfers have  led to higher regional convergence, Cappelen et al. (2003)  argues 
that EU regional support through the structural funds has had significant and positive 
impact on the convergence around Europe while Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005), 
acknowledge that there has been a significant level of GDP growth at both a country and 
regional level, however they could not connect this to EU transfers . 
Even tough convergence is a relevant topic, one of the most interesting subjects regarding 
EU regional transfers is what are its major determinants and how they affect the size of 
the grants that each EU member receives. When it comes to the distribution criteria, it 
was usually taken as granted that they were technocratically decided and implemented  
by member states and the European Commission and that the criteria for allocations were 
strictly economic, however, the literature that will be examined shows that the official 
criteria may not be the only determinant when it comes to EU regional transfers.  
This paper will follow the subsequent structure, first the EU regional policy, funds, and 
its importance in the European Union was explained, then a literature review will be made 
to access the known determinants and the factors that influence the functioning and the 
establishment of the EU regional policy, based on the existence literature two different 
regression models will be used to test the effects of the determinants and how they have 
changed between the 2007-2013 MFF and the 2014-2020 MFF, afterwards all of this will 
be analyzed when drawing the conclusions. 
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II. Literature Review 
The initial literature regarding what might affect the regional transfers in the European 
Union stated that the economic situation of each country determined the amount of money 
that each one would obtain, Tangermann, (1997), Anderson and Tyers, (1995), 
Courchene et al, (1993)  in their analysis of EU regional policy and its challenges with 
the upcoming enlargement of 2004, concluded that indicators such as unemployment, 
GDP  per capita and the overall percentage and weight of the agriculture sector in the 
economy are the major factors and that countries with a higher unemployment, low GDP 
per capita and/or where the agriculture sector still represents a big part of the economy 
are the main receivers of EU regional transfers. 
However, since the start of the 21st Century the literature evolved and now the emphasis 
is on the fact that even tough economic factors remain extremely important, they don´t 
tell the whole story and are not sufficient to explain the distribution of EU funds 
(Bodenstein et and Kemmerling, 201),  (Kalman, 2011),  (Citi and Justesen, 2020). 
One of this determinants is Partisan Politics, Citi and Justesen, (2020) pointed out in their 
analysis , of the net fiscal position of each member state between (1979-2014), and several 
national-level political and economic indicators, that governments with a center-right 
profile received more in EU transfers than other member states, one reason for this can 
be found in their other finding , that the voting power of each member state in the 
European Council is unrelated to a more positive fiscal balance which means that 
countries will form coalitions with ideological similar governments and if they are the 
majority, they will be able to receive more in regional transfers, this ideological 
similarities can be of two types, of overall ideology or in matters of European 
redistributive policy. On a regional and national level, politics also determines the fiscal 
position where regional governments and mayors find themselves in, Kalman (2011) 
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studied the allocation patterns in Hungary between 2004 and 2008, Dellmuth & Stoffel 
(2012) in Germany between 2000-2006 and  Dotti (2015) during the same time period in 
Germany, but also in France, Italy, Spain and the UK and they all reached similar  
conclusions, that a region/administrative region will likely receive more EU funding if 
the governing party is the same as the central government. 
An additional determinant that receives attention in the literature is the Absorption 
Capacity, in other words, how countries have used EU funds in the past and their capacity 
to do it in an efficient and lawful way in the future. Dellmuth (2011) indicates in her 
analysis of the allocation of EU funds in the EU-15 between 2000-2006 that the EU 
Commission in constitutionally weak regions (with a history of misusing EU funds and/or 
higher corruption, low democratic indications, weak institutions) takes in consideration 
the “track record” of the use of EU funds in the previous cycles, due to the fact that the 
misuse of EU funds among other things has an negative effect in the EU´s reputation,  
Heijman and Koch, (2011) when analyzing the predicted vs actual allocation of EU 
transfers between 2007-2013 concluded that between the highest recipients of EU 
transfers, Bulgaria and Romania had received far less than predicted compared to 
countries like Portugal, Spain, Czechia, and Poland, they state that two factors behind 
could have been their expertise to attract EU funds but also their inefficiency and lack of 
projects to use the money on. 
. The fourth determinant addressed in the literature is the Degree of self-governance, how 
decentralized is the political power in a EU member state. Védrine (2018) analyzed the 
relation between the degree of decentralization of public policy and the Cohesion Policy 
and describes that spatial interactions2 in a country during the allocation of EU  transfers 
are higher when the policy making is more decentralized, simply put, it establishes the 
 
2 Spatial Interaction is a dynamic flow process from one location to another. 
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relation between more EU funds and a decentralized system of governance, however it 
does not provide an explanation on why this interaction exists, Bodenstein and 
Kemmerling, (2011) provide this explanation, they studied the distribution of EU funds 
in 137 regions between 2000-2006 and found that the more political competencies a 
region has, the more Structural Funds transfers per capita the region receives, the reason 
behind this is that federal regions have more lobbying and bargaining power both at a 
European and national level than regions in unitary states, and that by decentralizing the 
political power EU funds can be used and allocated to projects in a more efficient way, 
for example, if Saxony in Germany needs more EU transfers, the minister president or a 
member of the regional government can go to Brussels and lobby directly with the 
Commission and the money can be distributed by the federal government without many 
bureaucracies,  on the other hand  a region like Alentejo in Portugal3 does not have that 
ability as the Portuguese Government creates special programs in each of  its 7 NUTS II 
regions in order to distribute and allocate the money coming from Brussels. This findings 
were in part corroborated by Chalmers (2013), that examined the connection between 
regional authority and EU funds,  although only for what he calls “Convergence Funds”4, 
that includes not only the CF and ERDF but also the European Social Fund. 
One recurrent theme in the literature regarding EU regional transfers but not yet linked to 
any determinant is Euroscepticism. It is believed  that the EU regional transfers reduce 
Euroscepticism and improve the image of the EU in the member states, Osterloh, (2011) 
in his  study of public opinion towards the European Union and regional transfers, noted 
that EU Structural Funds had positive impact on the positive perceptions of the EU and 
concluded that an increase in transfers per capita from the EU to a region by 100 Euros 
 
3 The least centralized country in Europe according to Lijphart (1999) 
4 Convergence and Competitive & Employment Funding 
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boosts the likelihood of one being positive about the EU by approximately 5 to 15% 
however this study has limitations since it was done using data from the 1994-1999 
structural funds and does not include any of the countries that have entered the EU since 
2004.  Dąbrowski, et all (2019) provides an updated version of this paper for the period 
between 2008-2015 and reached a similar conclusion that there is a positive relation 
between more EU regional transfers and the public perception of the EU, furthermore a 
deteriorating economic condition fuels more negative opinions and views on the EU.  
Moreover, Jackson et al (2011), demonstrated in their analysis of the attitudes of Poles 
towards the EU, that there was a more positive view of the EU by the Polish general 
public after entering in 2004 compared to before, and that this improved view of the EU 
was related to the size of EU transfers and gains in personal income.  
 
III. Data and Methodology5 
Based on the literature review, one was able to select the variables that will be tested. The 
dataset consists in yearly data collected for all EU member states (including the United 
Kingdom) over the period between 2000 and 2020. 
The study entails two regression analysis comparing two different Multiannual Financial 
Frameworks, the dependent variable will be the amount transfers and grants transferred 
to EU members states under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and the 
Cohesion Fund (CF) , per capita in the MFF of 2007-2013 and 2014-20, provided by the 
EU Commission, using the ERDF and CF seems appropriate since they are the two funds 
that make up the EU regional policy. 
There will be five type of  explanatory variables, each type will have several explanatory 
variables. The first one is economics factors, based on the literature review the 
 
5 More details Appendix 3 
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explanatory variables will be the unemployment rate, the size of the agriculture sector 
and the GDP per capita, it is expected that the first two will have a positive sign, differing 
from the GDP per capita that is expected to have a negative sign. Since the 2014-2020 
MFF was negotiated  during European Debt Crisis this study will add to the literature new 
explanatory variables such as National Debt and the poverty rate to test if the public 
finances of a country and the overall poverty have any impact in the allocation of EU 
transfers. The next one is the partisan politics, the composition of the European Council 
between January and June of ,2006 and 2013 will be used to detect if there is any relation 
between the political affiliation of a government and the outcome of the Multiannual 
Financial Framework, the European Party affiliation will be the variable. For the 
absorption capacity, the explanatory variables to be tested will be the absorption rate, how 
efficiently each member state absorbed and spent Structural Funds in the previous MFF, 
and also the fraud detected and reported as a percentage of cohesion policy funds during 
the previous MFF6. One of the reasons for the use of these variables is that Dellmuth 
(2011) points out that the EU considers the effect that the mismanagement of the regional 
transfers can have in its reputation and since this study was done with data that precedes 
the entry of countries from Central and Eastern Europe one of the objectives is to study 
if these concepts are still valid after the EU enlargement of 2004. 
When it comes to the degree of self-governance the principles of Bodenstein and 
Kemmerling, (2011) will be tested and unlike previous studies it will include the new EU 
member states that were not included in their paper, the Lijphart Regional Authority Index 
will be used to measure the degree of self-governance in a EU member state. 
The final explanatory variables will assess Euroscepticism, this study will be among the 
first where Euroscepticism is tested as a determinant of EU regional transfers, the logic 
 
6 No data was available prior to the 2007-2013 MFF, so that data was used for both regressions  
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behind this addition is the confidence expressed in the literature review that EU transfers 
have a positive impact in the attitudes of the general public towards the EU, and that the 
EU might intentionally or unintentionally use its transfers to boost its image in more 
Eurosceptic countries, to measure Euroscepticism it will be used the answer to the a 
question asked every during the Eurobarometer survey “Do you think (our country’s) 
membership is: a good thing; a bad thing; neither good nor bad; do not know?” , more 
specifically the percentage that answered that EU membership in their country was a bad 
thing, this way of analyzing Euroscepticism in widely present in literature (Serricchio et 
al. 2013), (Gabel and Palmer, 1995), (McLaren, 2004). But Euroscepticism can also 
express itself in other forms, Goodliffe, (2015) and Ultan & Ornek (2015) found a relation 
between the backlash against European integration, its perceived  Democratic Deficit and 
the success of anti-European Union and Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament 
Elections, moreover Van Spanje and De Vreese, (2011) state that diverse opinions 
towards the EU influenced voting intentions in the 2009 EP elections, and that these 
effects were greater in countries with more polarized political positions regarding 
European identity and integration, so a variable measuring the success of Eurosceptic 
parties in the EP elections will also be tested.  
The methodology used will be to calculate multiple regressions for each Multiannual 
Financial Framework using the same explanatory variables, in order to make comparisons 
between them and draw final conclusions, the regressions will be determined using the 
program Stata 15. The amount of observations is restricted and due to that the general 
specification will use ten explanatory variables that will be as follows: 
Log RGT t = β0 +β1 GDPpc +β2 UNEMP +β3 PRMSCT +β4 NTDEBT +β5 POVRT + 
β6 POLAF + β7 RGTfraud +β8 ABSP +β9 SELFG + β10 EUROSPM + β11 EPELECT 
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In each MFF, the initial model will test the economic variables, the other explanatory 
variables will be added and excluded as their significance is tested. This study will use a 
higher level of significance for the explanatory variables. In fact, with the conducted 
significance tests some variables could seem insignificant  due to the small sample size. 
That is why this study will have a higher than usual 15% significance level. 
 
1. Serial Correlation   
Before studying the interactions between the EU regional transfers and the explanatory 
variables  we need to find if there is independency across explanatory variables or a cross 
sectional dependency and correct it if needed. Several tests, such as Breusch Pagan test 
(Brooks, 2008), and Pesaran CD, are used to test for cross sectional dependency also 
known as spatial autocorrelation.  
In this work project the Breusch Pagan test was applied, the test done on the regressions 
using level variables indicated an autocorrelation of order 1 to 4,  it could possibly mean 
that the standard errors are wrong. and/or the coefficients are imprecise. Hence, it might 
mislead the final conclusions (Brooks, 2008). 
In order to fix the cross-section dependency and autocorrelation, one must subtract from 
the baseline model a lagged version of the same model with a new coefficient ρ ( Brooks 
(2008, p.146-153), where   is the vector of all the independent variables,  the vector 
of the coefficients,  the residual variable error term,   at time t  the dependent variable, 
and  a coefficient:  
 
                       ,     with            
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In this work project, first differences will be used to correct the serial correlation (Brooks 
2008) ,  will be set at    even though it ought to be estimated,  
 
 
Next, several Dickey Fuller tests will be done on the model and according to the results 
(Appendix 4), there is a presence of one unit root in every series of the model, due to that 
in order to make the series stationary all the variables need to be differentiated. This will 
be the baseline model that will be used in the analysis: 
 
 (Log RGT t) = β0 + β1 GDPpc +β2 UNEMP +β3 PRMSCT +β4 NTDEBT 
+β5 POVRT + β6 POLAF + β7 RGTfraud +β8 ABSP +β9 SELFG + β10
EUROSPM + β11 EPELECT 
 
The regressions will be estimated with Ordinary Least Squares, this method does not 
allow a long run equilibrium, in addition since the number of observations are small the 
probability of finding a long-term equilibrium is also extremely low, nevertheless, this 




IV.  Empirical results and Analysis 
 
Before running the model, the Variance Inflation Factor test, and as previously shown the 
Breusch tests were done in order to  confirm the normality of residuals and they confirm 
that the model is not in violation of autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and 
heteroscedasticity. 
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   1. Multiannual Financial Framework 2007-2013 
The results are present on Table 1. The first Model (M1) was done with the three 
economic variables most present in the literature, the GDP per capita, the Unemployment 
rate and the weight of the agriculture and fishing sectors in a country´s economy, this 
three economic  explanatory variables will be the starting point in both regression models,  
as expected all of them showed at least some significance, a positive effect from the 
unemployment  (unemp) and weight of the primary sector (prmsct), and a negative effect 
for the GDP per capita (gpdpc), in this first model the adjusted R square had a good 
explanatory strength. 
For the second model (M2) two more economic explanatory variables were included, in 
order to test the influence of poverty and the situation of a member state public finances 
in the allocation of EU regional transfers, the poverty rate and the national debt as a 
percentage of the GDP. The overall strength of the model increased slightly,  the povrt 
had a positive sign and significance, however the other explanatory variable added, 
ntdebt, was not significant, all of the explanatory variables that were included in both M1 
and M2 remained significant. 
Model 3 (M3) tests the effects of the political affiliation of each government  , the national 
debt was taken out of the model and all the other explanatory variables were maintained. 
The new explanatory variable had a  positive  sign, and it was significant, additionally it 
also increased the overall significance and strength of the model. For the subsequent tests, 
all of the explanatory variables of M3, gpdpc, unemp, prmsct povrt and polaf were kept 
with the purpose of testing the effect of the other explanatory variables. 
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Table 1: Regression results7 
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    (-1.71) 
Δunemp  7.87* 
(5.58)  
 8.24*  
  (6.15)  






  7.49*  
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   3.71° 
    (2.52) 








   1.49° 
    (0.61) 
Δrgtfraud      0.37  
(0.91)  
    




  1.85  
(1.23) 
    
Δselfg   
  
       -3.72 
 (-2.81) 
  
Δeurospm    
  




Δepelect    
  




 -0.03  
 (3.64)  
Adj-R²  
F-statistic  




0.7361   
8.18  
0.6353   
6.75  
0.5921   
10.84  
0.5191          
6.39           
.         °Significant at 15%; *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.   
 
In Model 4 (M4) the new explanatory variables added in order to test the absorption 
capacity had a positive sign but were not significant, the overall explanatory strength of 
the model decreased. Model 5 (M5) takes into consideration the degree of self-
governance , in this model all the significant explanatory variables from M3 and M4 
remained, overall selfg had a negative effect on the value of EU regional transfers, and it 
was not statistically significant, the overall strength of the model decreased compared to 
all the previous models. 
 
7 Standard errors in parentheses, robust to potential correlation of errors and heteroscedasticity 




For sixth model (M6)  the variable selfg was removed due to its insignificance, M6 
considers the two variables more commonly used to measure Euroscepticism, the share 
of the population that considers their countries membership of the European Union a “bad 
thing”, and the share of the vote for anti-EU and Eurosceptic parties in the European 
Parliament Elections prior to the MFF. The variable eurospsm had a slight positive effect 
on the dependent variable, and epelect a negative sign, but no variable showed 
significance, all the other explanatory variables remained significant, but the model was 
not significant. 
The results of this first regression model confirm a lot of the past literature regarding the 
determinants of EU regional transfers, economic factors were the main driver of the 
amount of transfers that were allocated to each country. A rich more developed member 
state with higher GDP, and lower unemployment receives fewer transfers than a more 
rural member state with a smaller GDP and higher unemployment. This means that the 
EU regional policy in the 2007-2013 MFF was achieving its purpose of trying to correct 
the economic and social disparities between EU member states, another indicator that 
showed a positive and significant sign was the poverty rate, that checks with what the 
other economic indicators tell us, poorer member states are the main targets of the EU 
regional policy. 
As for the political affiliation, according to the results, center right governments have a 
small advantage when the allocation of EU transfers its completed, thus confirming 
previous studies (Citi and Justesen, 2020), but this can also be explained by the fact that 
the EU member states that were part of the CEE group of countries tend to be poorer than 
countries in western Europe and also more right wing and conservative in their politic 
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ideology (Hloušek & Kopecek, 2010), the following regression analysis will provide a 
better understanding regarding this matter. 
The level of national debt was  insignificant for the allocation of EU transfers in this MFF, 
one of the reasons for this can be that prior to the 2008 financial crisis and recession 
national debt levels with one or two exceptions were similar throughout EU member 
states (Lojsch et al. 2011) . 
The absorption capacity also did not have a significant impact on the allocation of EU 
transfers in the first MFF, it can be explained by the fact that this was the first MFF with 
the 10 new members states that joined in 2004 EU enlargement and also Bulgaria and 
Romania that joined in 2007, so all of this countries did not have any real history 
managing EU funds as full EU members states, the new model for the 2014-2020 MFF 
will give us a better understanding about this subject. 
Unlike Bodenstein and Kemmerling (2011) the degree of self-governance had a negative 
effect; and it was not significant, an explanation for these results can be that Bodenstein 
and Kemmerling (2011) in their study did not include the new EU member states that 
joined from 2004 onward all of them being unitary states, unlike several EU members 
such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, or Italy that are defined as federations or 
devolved states8 
To conclude, these results validate some of the assertions regarding the allocation of EU 
transfers and that the main determinants are the overall prosperity and structure of their 
economy, but that there is still room for political influence in the process. The following 
regression model will help us getting a better understating, as will show if the results are 
similar or if there were any changes from one MFF to another. 
 
8 System of government where the central government devolves a number of powers to regions, 
some with a larger degree of autonomy than others. 




   2.Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 
The results are presented on Table 2. In the first model one (M1), as expected, all of the 
explanatory variables had at least some significance, the unemployment and weight of 
the primary sector had a positive effect, and the GDP per capita a negative effect, the 
adjusted R- square had explanatory strength. 
In Model 2 (M2) the overall strength of the model increased, however, the unemployment 
rate lost significance and the poverty rate did not show any significance. Likewise, the 
national debt showed no significance and an unexpected, a negative effect, the other 
explanatory variables remain significant. 
For Model 3 (M3), the poverty rate and national debt were taken out of the model and 
even though the unemployment was also non-significant in M2, because it was significant 
in M1, this explanatory variable was kept. The variable polaf despite the fact that it had 
a slight positive sign it was not significant, and it also decreased the overall significance 
and quality of the model. For the following tests, the two non-significant variables unemp 
and polaf were excluded. 
 
Table 2 : Regression results9 



















  -6.87* 








 8.41  
(15.73) 
        














Δntdebt    -2.28 
(-6.84)  
      
Δpovrt    2.51  
(10.51) 
        
 
9 Standard errors in parentheses, robust to potential correlation of errors and heteroscedasticity 
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Δrgtfraud      -0.005  
(-0.123)  
     




  3.23*  
(0.10) 
    3.58*  
(0.83) 
Δfedrl    
  
       -0.57 
 (-1.62) 
   
Δeurospm    
  
        
 
 2.68* 
  (6.13) 
2.14* 
(6.36) 
Δepelect    
  




 0.58  









0.5365   
8.07  
0.6353   
7.64  
0.5532   
10.71  
0.6012          
7.86           
0.7513          
6.31           
.      °Significant at 15%; *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.   
 
In Model 4 (M4) the absorption rate and the percentage of fraud detected in previous 
MFF´s were added in order to test their impact, the latest did not have any impact on the 
amount of regional transfers and was also insignificant, in contrary, the absp had a 
positive impact in the amount of transfers, and it was also statistically significant, the 
overall explanatory strength of the model increased compared to M3 even though its 
explanatory strength  is still inferior to M2. 
Model 5 (M5) takes into consideration the degree of self-governance, in this model the 
three significant economic variables were kept, the explanatory variables used to test the 
absorption capacity were also dropped. The absp was dropped even though it was 
significant  with the purpose of assessing in more detail the effect of the degree of self-
governance, fedrl  had a negative effect of the value of EU regional transfers, and it was 
not statistically significant, the overall strength of the model decreased compared to the 
previous one M4.   
In the sixth model (M6) the variable fedrl was removed due to its insignificance, M6 
considers the two variables used to evaluate Euroscepticism, both new variables had a 
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positive effect on the dependent variable however only the explanatory variable eurospm 
showed any significance, the two economic explanatory variables remained significant, 
the GDP per capita with a negative effect and the weight of the agriculture sector with a 
positive sign. The overall explanatory quality of M6 was good and increased compared 
to the previous one.  
The seventh and last model (M7) was done with all the significant explanatory variables 
identified throughout the models. All of them are significant and have a positive impact 
on the dependent variable except for the GDP per capita that has an negative effect, the 
explanatory power of M7 its the highest of all the models. 
There are some similarities between the determinants of the EU regionals transfers in the 
2007-2013 MFF, and 2014-2020 MFF, however there are also some stark differences. 
Firstly, from the first regression model to the second the GDP per capita and weight of 
the Agriculture sector remained significant variables, and just like in the first MFF it is in 
line with much of the literature, nevertheless, the unemployment rate and the poverty rate 
lost significance, it can be explained by the fact that new EU members see a significant 
economic growth and at a faster rate than the in rest of the EU and as a consequence the 
disparities between the “rich” and “poor” countries are reduced (Breuss, 2001), 
(Leonardi, 2006). In fact, this is what happened to the CEE countries right after the EU 
enlargement of 2004, the new EU member states were able to reduce unemployment and 
grow at a faster rate than the EU-15 countries, thus reducing the economic development 
gap between them, although the gap it still comprehensive, mainly when it comes to 
infrastructure and the overall structure of their economy, and a real converge it still years 
and maybe decades away of being accomplished (Rapacki and Prochniak, 2009).  
Therefore, some economic indicators lost significance like the unemployment and 
poverty rate did, however because there are still big disparities and structural differences 
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between them, explanatory variables such as the GDP per capita and weight of the 
agriculture sector are still significant.  
The level of national debt was not significant in both MFF´s, implying that the situation 
of a member state public finances does not influence the allocation of regional transfers. 
 Like in the first regression model the political affiliation had a positive sign, yet it lost 
the significance, this results go against the first regression model and may indicate that 
nature of the partisan politics in the European Council has changed from the typical 
partisanship that is present in every EU member, between the overall ideology and 
philosophies of Socialists, Social or Christian Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives to 
a partisanship based on matters of European redistributive policy, just as Citi and 
Justesen, (2020) had also suggested, and that´s why EU leaders in the European Council 
started crossing parties lines in order to form issue-based coalitions (Tallberg and 
Johansson, 2008), the recent group of 16 EU member states “Friends of Cohesion” 
confirms this idea, that was an issue-based coalition made of socialists, liberals and 
conservatives heads of governments all belonging to different Party Families united under 
the same ideas and objectives regarding EU redistributive policy. The absorption capacity 
was significant, specifically the absorption rate with a positive sign, meaning that the 
results corroborate Dellmuth (2011) assertion that the European Union takes into 
consideration a country track record when allocating EU transfers, countries with a good 
track record on the 2007-2013 MFF found themselves in a better position in the 
subsequent MFF. 
Similarly, to the first regression the degree of self-governance had a negative sign but 
was insignificant thus confirming the idea that because more unitary states joined the EU 
and those states are the main receipts of regional transfers, the effect described in 
(Bodenstein & Kemmerling, 2011) was possibly lost or it became irrelevant. 
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Lastly, one of the major differences between both regressions is the significance of 
Euroscepticism, the share of the vote for Eurosceptic parties changed sign but remained 
insignificant, however, the negative opinions towards the EU membership of their 
country seems to have a positive sign in the allocation of regional transfers. As a matter 
of fact, trust in the European Union eroded and Eurosceptic attitudes increased during the 
financial crisis (Bãcescu, 2014), (Serricchio et al, 2013) plus according to the literature, 
EU transfers boost the EU´s image, the model connects attitudes towards the EU with the 
allocation of EU regional transfers and suggests that the EU might have purposely or not 
tried to tackle the rising Euroscepticism by allocating more funds to more Eurosceptic 
countries and regions, Oberhofer and Bachtrögler, (2018) support this idea, they analyzed 
the implementation of EU transfers in France together with the support for the 
Eurosceptic far-right politician Marine Le Pen and found that economic growth prompted 
by EU transfers was noticeable to the French electorate and stalled her electoral 
performance.  
In conclusion from the 2007-2013 MFF to the MFF 2014-2020 economic factors 
remained the most essential factors for the allocation of EU transfers, however, they lost 
some importance in their allocation to political factors like the countries track record 
managing funds and the attitudes of their citizens towards the European Union. 
 
V. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The original goal of this work project was to make a casual analysis of the determinants 
of EU regional transfers, however since the methodology that this study followed was 
two regression models it was only possible to test dependence amongst variables therefore 
it was not possible to prove causality. Another limitation of this study was the small 
sample size and the lack of data that is available regarding the overall corruption in EU 
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countries, the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International is the most 
widely indicator used to measure corruption however since perception is at the heart of 
the index, it can be difficult to define and measure it (Louis, 2007), so this indicator was 
not used, other weakness regarding corruption was the fact that there was not any data 
regarding Fraud detected and reported with EU funds for the period prior to 2007-2013, 
so that data had to be used in both regression models. 
 For further research it would be interesting to have another model for the next 
Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2017), to evaluate whether or not the results in 
the two models still hold or if there are new developments, although the effects of the 
COVID 19 pandemic, might distort the results, another interesting topic for research 
would be to compare the allocation of regional transfers in a small group of EU countries 
instead of all member states, using data from a more extent period of time, however that 
could pose some challenges since almost every EU country joined at a different point in 
time. As an example, there is a lot more data regarding allocation of EU transfers in 
Portugal or Greece, than in Romania or Croatia10. 
Finally, to extend this study, the same analysis could be done on a NUTS II level, it would 
provide a greater knowledge regarding the distribution of EU transfers, and it would give 
us a glimpse into regional dynamics regarding the allocation of EU transfers in all the 
members states and  possibly the explanations for these dynamics.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
This work project first objective was to identify the determinants of the European Union 
Regional transfers and it was developed based on the existence literature regarding the 
political economy of the determinants of EU regional transfers, during the literature 
 
10 Greece joined the EU in 1981, Portugal in 1986, Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013 
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review several economic and political factors were collected, based on that same and 
other literature others were added as possible determinants, this study focused on how 
and why those possible determinants affected the allocation of EU regional transfers our 
if they did not have any effect at all, in order to do that, two regressions models were 
built, using data spanning from 2000 to 2020,  one for the MFF (2007-2013) and other 
for the MFF (2014-2020), the overall statistics shows that both models had a good 
explanatory power and were statistically significant. According to the results, the 
economic needs of each country are still the biggest determining factors in how EU 
transfers are allocated, rurality, lack of infrastructure, unemployment and GDP have a big 
influence in the amount of grants that a country receives and that is what is expected since 
their main goal is to reduce economic disparities between member states, however, as 
these disparities are reduced, so is the influence of economic factors, there has been a 
shift from the economic needs of each country, to the way they are able manage EU funds 
and how their citizens fell about the EU, the political influence has also shifted from 
party-based coalitions to a needs-based coalition, with countries lead by ideologically  
opposite leaders joining forces to influence the amount of grants that their countries 
obtain. Even though the inequalities between countries the European Union  have 
diminished in the past years, they are still significant, and a lot of countries rely on EU 
transfers to end these inequalities, if the shift from economic to political factors continues, 
the EU regional transfers can start deviating even more from their main goal of correcting 
and reducing economic disparities between countries in the European Union, and that 
could jeopardize the economic development of the poorest EU member states. This is 
extremely important since the medium and long economic effects of the  COVID 19 
pandemic will most certainly  aggravate these disparities, thus exponentially  increasing 
the importance of EU regional transfers. 
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Appendix 1: Inflow of EU regional transfers per capita in the Multiannual Financial Framework of 2007-











Appendix 2: Inflow of EU regional transfers per capita in the Multiannual Financial Framework of 2014-
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Appendix 3: Detailed description of the dependent and explanatory variables 
 
Variable  Description  
RGT t The total amount of regional transfers per capita in the Multiannual 
Financial Framework of 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 for each 
member state. Source: EU Commission 
GDPpc The average Gross Domestic Product per Capita for each member 
state between 2000- 2006 and 2007- 2013.  
Source: Eurostat  
UNEMP The average Unemployment rate in each member state between 
2000 - 2006 and 2007- 2013. Source: Eurostat 
PRMSCT The percentage that Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, represent 
in each country GDP between 2000- 2006 and 2007- 2013. 
Source: World Bank 
NTDEBT The average Unemployment  National debt as a percentage of the 
Gross domestic product between 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 
Source: Eurostat 
POVRT The average percentage of the population that is at risk of poverty 
in each EU country between 2000-2006 and 2007-2013.  
Source: Eurostat 
POLAF Binomial variable representing the political affiliation of each EU 
council representative (Prime Minister, Chancellor or President) 
in early 2006 and 2013. 0 is for members of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), nonaffiliated or 
European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL). 1 is for 
members of the European People's Party (EPP), Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) or European 
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)   
RGTfraud Fraud detected and reported as a percentage of cohesion policy 
funds received by EU Member States in the 2007-2013 
programming period. Source: European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF) 
ABSP The absorption rate of EU funds in the period between 2000-2006 
and 2007-2013 Source: EU Comission 
SELFG Lijphart federalism or regional authority index, the score varies 
from 5, the most federalized country, to 1, the most centralized 
country. 
EUROSPM The percentage of people that answered in the Eurobarometer that 
EU membership of their country was a bad thing. Source: 
Eurobarometer 
EPELECT The share of the vote for Eurosceptic or Anti EU parties in the 
2004 and 2009 European Parliament Elections 
























(time trend (t))  
Critical 
value  
log(rgt)  2  -2,81 -3,238  log(rgt)  2  -2,146  -3,238  
gdppc  2  -0,853  -3,238  gdppc  2  -0,942  -3,238  
unemp  2  -1,461  -3,238  unemp  2  -0,1653  -3,238  
prmsct  2  -2,219  -3,238  prmsct  2  -1,034  -3,238  
ntdebt  2  -1,472  -3,238  ntdebt  2  -1,954  -3,238  
povrt   2  -2,102  -3,238  povrt   2  -2,850 -3,238  
polaf  2  1,21  -3,238  polaf  2  -1,981  -3,238  
rgtfraud  2  -0,578  -3,238  rgtfraud  2  -0,109  -3,238  
absp  2  -1,23  -3,238  absp  2  -1,013  -3,238  
fedrl  2  -3,143  -3,238  fedrl  2  -3,185  -3,238  
eurospm  2  -1,076  -3,238  eurospm  2  -1,285  -3,238  
epelect  2  -2,907  -3,238  epelect  2  -3,025  -3,238  
        
*Reject the hypothesis of a unit root.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
